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RETHINKING THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM: A REPORT
FROM THE ABA ACTION COMMISSION
ROBERT B. McKAYt
I.

INTRODUCTION

T is a particular pleasure for me to come to Villanova Law
lSchool on this special occasion. To be allowed to participate in
the present symposium on the tort liability system is something
else and, in a way, more of an honor for me.
I have never been a student of the tort liability system. I do
not-and would not be allowed to-teach the subject in my own
law school. My ostensible qualification, as Chair of the American
Bar Association Action Commission to Improve the Tort Liability
System, does not signify knowledge of the subject. In truth, I was
selected to head the Commission almost because of my lack of
knowledge of the subject matter, with which the other thirteen
Commission members were fully conversant. In short, a kind of
neutral was needed to monitor the discussions in the search for
illumination on this controversial topic. It became the task of
those others to educate me to their various viewpoints. And educate me they did. Although I am still no scholar of the subject, I
now at least know the vocabulary. I come to you with firm conviction in support of the propositions approved by the Commission,
and am willing to defend even the somewhat amended version
approved by the ABA House of Delegates on February 17, 1987.1
II.

THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE "TORT LIABILITY INSURANCE
CRISIS"

In recent decades the property/casualty portions of the insurance industry have engaged in more or less violent cyclical swings of boom and bust, profitability and loss. 2 For example, in
t Professor of Law, New York University; Chair, American Bar Association
Action Commission to Improve the Tort Liability System (1985-87). B.S., University of Kansas; J.D., Yale University.
1. See A.B.A., Report of the American Bar Association Action Commission to Improve

the Tort Liability System (1987) [hereinafter ABA Tort Liability System]

2. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SUMMARY OF SELECTIVE STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTION: AFFORDABILITY AND AVAILABILITY OF LIABILITY
INSURANCE (August, 1986); see also ABA Tort Liability System, supra note 1, at 7
n. 13; INSURING OUR FUTURE: REPORT OF THE (NEW YORK) GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON LIABILITY INSURANCE 8 (1986).
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the medical malpractice "crisis" of the mid-1970s, the insurance
companies were receiving low returns on their investments while
payments for medical malpractice claims were increasing rapidly.
Accordingly, and not surprisingly, the companies raised their
rates dramatically, prompting startled protests from the health
care services, particularly medical doctors. As a result of the complaints of the powerful medical profession, many states adopted
legislation designed to reduce the recoveries and thus to influence a downturn in rates. 3 Much of the legislation was ill-conceived, or at least did not perform as intended. But the "crisis"
subsided, probably for two reasons. Most important was the fact
that in the late 1970s and early 1980s interest rates began their
dramatic climb, which permitted the insurance carriers to recoup
their liability payouts with income from their investments of premium income. 4 Accordingly, further rate increases became unnecessary, and even some reductions were possible. Secondarily,
even where rates were not reduced to their former low levels,
doctors adjusted to the higher rates as a cost of business that was
comfortably passed on to their patients.
In the early 1980s, with interest rates at the highest level in
memory, insurance companies prospered, and to some extent the
favorable income statistics were passed on to customers in rates
that did not reflect the cost of risk insurance, but were unrealistically low because of the hugely favorable investment climate.
This more or less euphoric state of affairs, momentarily
favorable to insurers and insureds (however unfortunate for the
economy as a whole) was not destined to last. As the economy
more or less righted itself and interest rates declined to less than
10 percent, the property/casualty insurance industry began to
suffer losses, sometimes severe, for two reasons. The artificially
low rates that had been offered to attract premiums to be invested
for high returns, now provided insufficient investment income to
meet actuarially predictable losses. Moreover, about the same
3. Statement of Johnny C. Finch, Senior Associate Director, General Government Division, GAO, before House of Representatives, Committee on Ways
and Means, Subcommittee on Oversight on April 28, 1986. See also Business
Insurance, Sept. 1, 1986, at 1 (indicating that aggregate operating income of 24
surveyed property/casualty insurers rose by 216.2% for first six months of 1986
as compared to same period in 1985).
4. See INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST SIX PROGRAM YEARS, APRIL 1980-MARCH 1986 3-4 (Rand 1986). Although the studies in
the aggregate cast doubt on the existence of a tort "litigation explosion," there
is reason to believe that substantial recent growth has occurred in the size of tort
recoveries at the upper end of the compensation continuum. Id.
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time, the cost of jury verdicts and settlements began to rise, perhaps not so much in terms of median awards, but the occasional
extraordinarily large (by earlier standards) awards which were ad5
vanced as justification for substantial rate increases.
Whatever the reason, the undisputed fact is that the cost of
insurance increased dramatically, 6 from at least 1984 through
1986. Those most affected were the health professionals (again),
lawyers (with rates that increased sometimes more than 1000 percent), accountants, engineers, municipalities (and their high
school athletic teams, ice-skating rinks, and other citizen-desired
services), and a vast array of other activities considered to involve
high risk of tort recovery. The sharp escalation of rates, across
the board, sometimes in staggering amount, was accompanied by
7
the total demise of insurance in some "high risk" occupations.
Thus came the twin aspects of what was popularly known as the
"insurance
crisis,"
consisting of "unaffordability"
and
"unavailability."
However exaggerated may have been some assertions of unreasonableness in the sudden increase in rates, it is at least clear
that insureds had been lulled into a false sense of economy as to
the true cost of insurance and were thus ill-prepared for the dramatic, perhaps unreasonable increases. What is difficult to determine is the extent to which the earlier rates were "too low" and
the extent to which the increases pushed them "too high." Insurance companies have never been notably forthcoming with their
official records or statements of profitability." However scanty
the records, this much at least seems supportable: the insurance
industry (especially the property/casualty branch) had some bad
years between 1983 and 1985, but did much better, perhaps spectacularly so, from 1985 to 1987. 9
III.

THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

The American Bar Association is ordinarily not reluctant to
5. For a more extensive discussion of the historical circumstances surrounding the insurance crisis, see generally ABA Tort Liability System, supra note 1,
at 1-8.
6. See ABA Tort Liability System, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing large increase in
premiums).
7. See id. at 3. Service providers such as doctors and day care centers, manufacturers of variety of products, and municipalities engaged in traditional public functions have had to confront the problem of unavailable insurance. Id.
8. See id. at 7-8.
9. Id. at 1-8.
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enter the public forum in defense of, or in opposition to, positions or proposals that it believes are within its broadly interpreted mandate of concern for the public interest.' 0 This is
particularly true, and justifiably so, as to issues considered likely
to have an impact on lawyers. The ABA has not hesitated to
adopt positions on antitrust matters, criminal justice issues, international affairs, nominations to the federal judiciary and ethical
codes for lawyers and judges.ll One wonders, then, why should
the ABA not take positions on product liability and other tort law
issues, malpractice insurance, and indeed the whole system of liability insurance? It is strange that before 1987 the ABA had no
reasoned position on the various aspects of the tort liability system and its insurance analog. That is nonetheless the surprising
fact.
In 1981 and 1983 the ABA made a feeble stab at the issue,
but came up with nothing more startling than general opposition
to federal legislation in the field of product liability.' 2 Clearly,
this was insufficient. The principal action had been, and continued to be, in the state legislatures, 13 where the ABA was reduced
to silence. With the advantage of hindsight, this incapacity becomes more understandable. As I have good reason to know,
there are strong pressures within the ABA that mobilize against
any action on this controversial set of issues. Those who favor
action would move in various, perhaps conflicting directions,
while others prefer to leave the matter to the slower process of
common law development. The resulting consensus has favored
inaction.
In a cautious move to break this impasse, in 1980, the ABA
commissioned a study of the entire question, chaired by former
Attorney General Griffin B. Bell. 14 The report, Towards aJurispru10. This concern for the public interest is evident throughout the ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY as well as other ABA publications that

are in the public interest, such as the Legal Education Newsletter, which seeks to
further lawyer competency, and Alternatives, which examines the availability of
legal services available to the public as a whole. See also ABA CONSTITUTION, art.
1, reprinted in, 5 American BarJournal 510 (1919) (setting out several objectives
of ABA, including: "promot[ing] the administration of justice and . . . uphold[ing] the honor of the profession of the law.").
11. These positions can be found in various ABA publications such as: ANTITRUST, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INTERNATIONAL LAW NEWS AND THE ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.

12. See ABA Tort Liability, supra note 1, at ix.
13. See generally NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE

LEGISLATURES, supra note

2.
14. Other members of the Committee were Walter H. Beckham, Jr.,
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dence of Injury: The Continuing Creation of a System of SubstantiveJustice
in American Tort Law, was released in 1984. That report, whose
principal author was Professor Marshall Shapo of Northwestern
Law School, carefully identified the issues and the alternative
choices, but did not make any specific recommendations suitable
5
to the ABA decision-making process.'
In the spring of 1985, a conference was assembled in Lexington, Kentucky, to review the report and recommend further steps
to the ABA. The unsurprising result was the recommendation for
yet another study group, but this time to make "action" recommendations. The true surprise was that I was later asked to chair
the resulting body. That was, however, the determination of then
ABA President William Falsgraf.' 6 To my own astonishment, I
agreed-and have never been sorry. As already noted, the experience was, for me, educational. Beyond that, and more important, it was an opportunity for me to become acquainted with, and
to become friends with lawyers who lived in a world previously
unknown to me. The experience was enlightening, exhilarating
and ultimately (I believe) useful.
IV.

THE ACTION COMMISSION AT WORK

The November, 1985 charge to the Action Commission 17 was
Bernard M. Borish, Philip H. Corboy, Donald M. Haskell, Weyman T. Lundquist, and Richard F. Suhrheinrich.
15. See ABA Tort Liability System, supra note 1, at 1. This remains the most
important previous statement on behalf of the ABA about the American tort
liability system. Although few specific recommendations were made, the report
did recognize several topics which merited further attention. Id.; see also Towards
a Jurisprudence of Injuoy: The Continuing Creation of a System of Substantive Justice in
American Tort Law, 13-1 (1984). Many of these recommended topics, such as
punitive damages, pain and suffering, and injury prevention received further discussion in the ABA Tort Liability System.
16. At our initial press conference in New York City I referred to him as
William Palsgraf. In justification, I can only recall that Palsgraf is the name by
which the most famous tort law case is known. Even I knew that.
17. The Commission membership was well chosen to include knowledgeable individuals with a good variety of views and experience that could be
brought to bear on questions of the tort liability system we were asked to investigate. Here are the names and brief identifications: Shirley S. AbrahamsonJustice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court since 1976; Guido Calabresi-Dean of
the Yale Law School, New Haven, Connecticut; Jim R. Carrigan-Judge of the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado; Thomas S. Chittenden-Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Citicorp Insurance
Group in New York City; Leonard Decof-Attorney from Providence, Rhode
Island; Don M.Jackson-Attorney from Phoenix, Arizona; Elaine Ruth JonesAttorney for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. in Washington D.C.; Thomas Lambert-Distinguished Professor at Suffolk University Law
School in Boston; Robert B. McKay-Professor of Law at New York University.
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as follows:
1. Consider recommendations for improving
methods and procedures for compensating persons injured as the result of the tortious conduct of other
persons;
2. Recommend means of implementing at the earliest possible date those improvements that the Commission finds to be most desirable or necessary to serve the
best interests of the public;
3. Recommend any further studies or actions by
the American Bar Association that the Commission
deems necessary or appropriate to improve methods and
procedures for compensating persons injured as the result of the tortious conduct of other persons.18
The Commission was asked to report within about a year,
specifically in time for the report to be distributed to members of
the House of Delegates, chairs of divisions, sections and committees, and to other interested persons, to permit debate on the recommendations at the February 1987 midwinter meeting of the
ABA House of Delegates. We met that timetable, and the report
was distributed in early January. As a presage of things to come,
opponents of change immediately complained that there was insufficient time to study the document. As we were soon to learn,
those who are unsure about defeating a proposal on the merits
will inevitably support delay. Others, apparently the majority, beChair of the Commission; Stephen B. Middlebrook-Vice President and General
Counsel of Aetna Life and Casualty Company in Hartford, Connecticut; Henry
G. Miller-Attorney from White Plains, New York, Past President of the New
York State Bar Association; Alan B. Morrison-Director of the Public Citizen
Litigation Group in Washington, D.C.; Jon 0. Newman-Judge, United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; John T. Subak-Group Vice President
and General Counsel for Rohm and Haas Company in Philadelphia. Jane Barrett, a Los Angeles attorney, was for some months a member of the Commission.
Her counsel, too, was helpful.
This recitation of members would be incomplete without reference to the
Commission Reporter, Professor Robert Rabin of the Stanford Law School. He
brought to the work of the Commission expertise, skills of written and oral articulation, willingness to work hard, and grace under pressure. Most important of
all, he prevented us from doing anything foolish while never seeking to inject his
own, possibly different, views into the joint effort.
Special thanks are also due Carolyn Taylor, the staff director of the Tort
and Insurance Practice Section (TIPS), who successfully steered the Commission
through the bureaucratic mysteries of the ABA.
For a fuller description of the Commission membership's qualifications, see
ABA Tort Liability' System, supra note 1,Appendix E.
18. See ABA Tort Liability System, supra note 1,at 1.
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lieved that the time had come (and indeed passed) when the ABA
should take a stand one way or the other on issues that had for at
least two years been extensively debated in state legislatures and,
to a lesser extent, in Congress. No longer was it acceptable for
the principal lawyer organization in the nation to sit out the debate on a subject of vital concern to the law and to lawyers with
what in effect amounted to a "no comment."
My one regret is that, shortly after the final meeting of the
Commission in December 1986, four members concluded that
they could not join the Report.' 9 Their principal expressed dissatisfaction was the failure of the Report to grapple with related
issues involving the insurance liability system. 20 But the Commission had decided early in its deliberations that it lacked the time,
resources, and specialized knowledge essential to the additional
task. 2' The assigned responsibility was to consider ways in which
the legal profession could put its own house in order, regardless
of charges of neglect or wrongdoing that could be laid at other
doors.
A.

The Deliberative Process

By the time the Report was released, it was apparent that the
forces of opposition, already mobilizing their allies, could develop powerful coalitions to defeat, or at least delay consideration. The Commission, however, was not without its own
supporters. The original sponsor of the idea of an Action Commission, and the principal financer of the endeavor, was the Torts
and Insurance Practice Section ("TIPS"). The governing body of
that section, the Council, is composed of individuals of widely varied interests, practice and views. Undoubtedly, some favored no
change in the tort liability system, while others may have preferred more sweeping changes than the Commission's rather
modest proposals. Nearly all were united on the proposition that
the ABA could no longer remain silent; speak it must if only to
say that all is well. Accordingly, the TIPS Council initiated dis19. The four dissenters were Hon. Jim R. Carrigan, Leonard Decof, Elaine
R. Jones, and Thomas Lambert. See id. at xi.
20. The Report recommended that a major study be conducted on the insurance liability system. See id. at xi. As recommended by the Action Commission, a new commission to study the insurance liability system was appointed by
President Eugene Thomas in June 1987.
21. See id. at 7. Although the Action Commission stressed the importance
of a thorough review of changes to be made in the present insurance system, the
Commission concluded that its members lacked the capacity to make such a
review-
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cussions with other sections, principally the Litigation Section
and the Corporation, Banking and Business Law Section of the
ABA. DuringJanuary 1987 and early February, until the very beginning of the House of Delegates debate on February 17, there
were extensive and intensive discussions in Palm Beach, Florida,
Snowmass, Colorado, Washington, D.C., New York City, Chicago, and finally in New Orleans, the site of the midwinter meeting of the ABA. In addition, there were innumerable one-on-one
telephone calls and multi-party conference calls.
The effort paid off. Although it was not possible to negotiate
complete agreement among the Commission and the three sections, we were able to come into the February meeting with suggested amendments to four of the twenty-one recommendations
that were agreed to by two or more of our negotiating components. Some of the suggested changes were clarifications, while
others were seen by the Commission as substantive improvements. Still others, however, were rejected by some or a majority
of the Commission as retreats from carefully formulated Commission positions.
Ultimately, this precarious coalition prevailed, with the Commission losing only one issue on which a majority had not accepted the modified language. And one amendment was
accepted on the floor for further clarification of language that
troubled delegates from the important states of California and
Florida.
To report ultimate success without more, is, however, to miss
the flavor of the contest. The day before the scheduled debate
there was a motion to delay consideration of the Report until the
annual meeting in San Francisco in August, ostensibly to permit
further study. Although that motion was defeated, a similar motion had to be put down on February 17, the day of scheduled
debate. Other procedural efforts to deflect consideration of the
merits continued as a major tactic of the opponents,-2 particularly
as they sensed growing support for the substance of the
recommendations.
When debate at last turned to the recommendations, which
were presented in clusters of related subject matter, the opposition surfaced its deeply felt objections to the Report, essentially
22. For example, a motion was made to approve Recommendation One
calling for a major study of the insurance liability system and to defer consideration of all other recommendations until that study was completed. The motion
was rejected after vigorous debate.
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in two respects. First, as previously reported in connection with
the views of the dissenters within the Commission, there had
been no significant study of the insurance liability system, which
many lawyers, particularly plaintiffs' lawyers, blame for whatever
problems may have arisen within the system.2 3 Second, many
lawyers believe that the tort liability system can better work its
way through any perceived problems with state courts than with
the unpredictable assistance of state legislatures. The opposition
was vehement and eloquent, particularly on the recommendations that sought modification of prevailing doctrine relating to
noneconomic damages (pain and suffering damages and punitive
damages); joint-and-several liability,2 4 and attorneys' fees.

After five-and-a-half hours of debate, the entire package, with
amendments previously agreed to by some or all of the principal
negotiators, was adopted. Before identifying the substance of the
recommendations, it may be appropriate to suggest reasons for
victory when defeat or at least deferral was generally predicted
even on the eve of debate. There were, I believe, five major factors that led to the favorable outcome.
First. The large measure of agreement reached among the
Action Commission, TIPS, Litigation Section and Business, Banking and Corporation law provided a strong core of support (and
effective speakers for the floor debate). The fact that sections
with such diverse interests could agree on the need for prompt
action was a signal to the entire House of Delegates that these
recommendations were at least not irresponsible.
Second. The Board of Governors solidly recommended approval of 19 of the 21 recommendations, withholding judgment
only on the two that were still being negotiated with the three
cooperating sections. President Eugene Thomas spoke strongly
on the floor in support of the package.
Third. By the time of the February debate, it was apparent to
nearly all delegates that, while the debate could be postponed until San Francisco, the issues would neither go away nor change
much in the interim. It must have occurred to some delegates
that there might be other, conceivably more interesting things to
do in San Francisco than to debate the same issues there again.
Fourth. As previously reported, the Action Commission rec23. See ABA Tort Liability System, supra note 1, at xi.
24. One widely respected veteran of the House of Delegates referred to the
proposed modification of the joint-and-several-liability rule as the "worst" he

had ever heard proposed on the floor of the House.
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ommendations were deliberately structured as a kind of package.
That is, every part was integral to every other part. It is not necessary to describe the result as a series of compromises to observe
that, in a group as diverse as the members of the Action Commission, no individual could hope to secure endorsement of the entire program that he or she favored. Thus, it was inevitable-and
I believe desirable-that all members should listen to each other,
reason with each other, and reach a common position on controverted matters. Finally, when ten members accepted this notion
of a package acceptable to all (only four dissenting), the theme of
each subsequent presentation, to cooperating sections, to the
Board of Governors, and in floor debate, was that the package
should not be broken. To delete or to alter substantially any one
section would jeopardize the whole with the risk of unraveling a
carefully structured proposal.
Fifth. It may be that the opposition tactics were ill-conceived.
The relentless resort to procedural devices to block consideration
on the merits may have provoked an adverse reaction, a feeling
that there was a concerted effort to prevent discussion of the merits. And, finally, the strident tone of opposition may have come
across as too doomsday an approach to recommendations that all
could see were modest, and some would say embarrassingly so.
B.

25
Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Commission Report

Before reviewing the recommendations of the Action Commission, and as amended by the House of Delegates, three preliminary observations are appropriate.
First. The most important thing to be said about the Report
and its recommendations is that the entire thrust is in reaffirmation of the American tort liability system. The premise of individual fault, as modified by court-developed rules of strict liability in
selected areas, 2 6 is fully preserved. No substantive principle of
tort law is rejected, and proposed modifications remain entirely
within the purpose and sense of prevailing law. Generally, traditional concepts in tort law are left undisturbed, save for minor
25. To understand fully how these recommendations fit into the existing
tort liability system in the United States, reference should be made to the text of
the Report, in which each recommendation (in its original form) is placed in the
context of the Report as a whole with additional comments on its potential
impact on the tort liability system.
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 507, 519 and 402A (1977) (setting forth special rules for "dangerous animals," "abnormally dangerous activities" and product liability, respectively).
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modifications. 2 7 No suggestion will be found of social insurance,
additions to strict liability rules, or no-fault provisions.
Second. The recommendations, viewed individually or collectively, are modest. The idea, consistent with the charge to the
Action Commission, is to improve the tort liability system-not to
remake it in a different mold. Some will criticize the recommendations for lack of boldness and challenge to the existing system.
Our aim was less far-reaching. Our objective was simply to improve that which we believe is not basically flawed.
Third. Only after the Action Commission completed its recommendations and published the Report did I realize (with the
assistance of the Commission Reporter, Robert Rabin) something
quite unique about the Report. While we set out to make proposals for improvement of the tort liability system-and certainly we
did, as our critics will testify, the Action Commission also did
something more.
The "something more" should be apparent to any thoughtful
observer who reads the recommendations without an awareness
of the assigned task and the background of the preparatory effort.
A significant, if not altogether consciously intended byproduct of
the recommendations taken as a whole is their focus on judicial
management. 28 As will be evident when the recommendations
are summarized below, many of the ideas about trial efficiency
and devices to reduce cost and delay are not new, 29 but remain
largely unimplemented in practice. The perhaps more novel recommendations relating to rules of the tort liability system also
involve process, calling upon judges to employ remittitur to protect against excessive jury verdicts, to ensure that standards for
application of punitive damages are rigorously enforced, and to
protect clients against attorney overreaching by way of excessive
fees. On reflection, it seems altogether appropriate that, in a
common law world, in which judges are the principal actors, judicial management should be a principal theme of a report con27. See, e.g., ABA Tort Liability Systemn, supra note 1, at 18, (recommendation
5(b) retains concept of punitive damages but advises that there should be higher
standard of proof in awarding of those damages).
28. See id. at 19, 34 (recommendation 5(c)(i) calls for appropriate pre-trial
procedures to be utilized in order to weed out frivolous claims for punitive damages prior to trial and recommendation 13 calls for "fast track" system to
streamline litigation in tort cases).
29. See, e.g., id. at 33 (recommendation 12 condemns dilatory tactics such as
frivolous and harassing discovery). The same intent can be found in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which seek to limit unreasonable discovery. FEn. R.
Civ: P. 26(b).
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cerned with improving the essentially common law domain of the
tort liability system.
V.

A.

THE RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendationsfor Further Study

The Action Commission made two principal recommendations for the establishment of new commissions to study particular problems related to the tort liability system, which were
beyond the scope and capacity of the Action Commission. Recommendation One urges the ABA to establish a commission "to
study and recommend ways to improve the liability insurance system as it affects the tort system." Recommendation 20 urges formation of a commission to study the mass tort problem and offer
"a set of concrete proposals for dealing in a fair and efficient
manner with these cases." Both Commissions have since been
established.
B.

Recommendations Relating to Principles of Tort Law

Pain and Suffering Damages
Recommendations 2-4 relate to pain and suffering damages.
Rejecting the arguments in favor of ceilings on pain and suffering
damages, the Commission instead calls upon the courts to make
greater use of remittitur and additur in modification of excessive
or inadequate awards. In addition, in an effort to secure better
information about tort awards than is currently available, "tort
award commissions" are recommended to review tort awards and
"suggest guidelines for future trial court reference." Further,
ABA entities are encouraged to explore "whether additional guidance can or should be given to the jury on the range of damages
to be awarded for pain and suffering in a particular case."
Punitive Damages
Recommendation 5, relating to punitive damages, supports
the continued award of those damages in "appropriate cases,"
but urges narrowing the scope of punitive damages in five ways:
i. The standard of proof for the award of punitive damages
should be tightened to limit such awards to "cases warranting
special sanctions and should not be commonplace." '
30. See Feld v. Merrian, 506 Pa. 383, 395, 485 A.2d 742, 747 (1984) where
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the same standard set forth in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) regarding the imposition of punitive
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ii. Various suggestions to the courts are advanced as a
means ofjudicial limitation of inappropriate or excessive awards.
iii. Appropriate safeguards "should be put in force to prevent any defendant from being subjected to punitive damages
that are excessive in the aggregate for the same wrongful act."
iv. "Legislatures and courts should be sensitive to adopting
appropriate safeguards to protect the master or principal from vicarious liability for the unauthorized acts of non-managerial ser3
vants or agents." '
v. In carefully selected cases, courts should be authorized to
award some portibn of a punitive damages award to "public purposes," always being mindful that the plaintiff and counsel are
reasonably compensated for bringing the action and prosecuting
the punitive damages claim.
Joint-and-SeveralLiability
Recommendation 6 on joint-and-several liability, although
considerably more modest than changes previously enacted by
some state legislatures, drew the most hostile response. The proposal was designed simply to recognize that, in the case of
noneconomic damages, justice to the victim does not require full
recovery against a defendant whose liability was "substantially
disproportionate to the total injury."
Attorneys' Fees
Recommendations 7-9 deal with attorneys' fees in three separate provisions:
a. "Fee arrangements with each party in tort cases should
damages. Specifically, the Feld court stated, "[p]unitive damages may be
awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive
or his reckless indifference to the rights of others." Id. Further, the court noted
that one must look to all the circumstances, including the motive of the wrongdoers and the relation between the parties. Id.; see also ABA Tort Liability System,
supra note 1, at 17 (Commission observes that punitive damages are being
awarded too frequently, especially in unintentional injury cases). The standard
of proof recommended by the Report is "clear and convincing evidence." ABA
Tort Liability System, supra note 1, at 18.
31. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS, § 70, at 504 (5th ed. 1984). Many modern courts have held employees to be within the scope of employment even if they deviate from the normal
course of employment for their own purposes so long as the deviation is "reasonably foreseeable." Id.; see also O'Boyle v. Avis Rent-A-Car, 78 A.D.2d 431,
435 N.Y.S.2d 296 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (employer held liable for actions of
underaged gas attendant who had taken car to lunch); cf Penn Central Transp.
v. Reddick, 398 A.2d 27 (D.C. 1979) (employer held not liable for servant's attack on plaintiff which in no degree was committed for employer's benefit).
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be set forth in a written agreement that clearly identifies the basis
on which the fee is to be calculated," and the various ways of
computing contingency fees should be clearly explained to prospective clients.
b. "Courts should discourage the practice of taking a percentage fee out of the gross amount of any judgment or settlement." Fees should be calculated instead on the net amount of
the recovery.
c. Courts should accept jurisdiction over complaints about
32
excessive fees.
Secrecy and Coercive Agreements
Recommendations 10-12 set forth a series of provisions
designed to protect against the harmful consequences sometimes
resulting from secrecy and coercive agreements.
Streamlining the Litigation Process: Frivolous Claims and Unnecessary
Delay
Recommendations 13-18 are designed to limit the harmful
consequences of frivolous claims and unnecessary delay, including the following:
i. "A 'fast track' system should be adopted .... .
ii. Courts should take steps "to adopt procedures for the
control and limitation of the scope and duration of discovery
iii. Standards similar to those in Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure should be adopted by the states. 3 3
32. The Pennsylvania Legislature has provided guidelines for the determination of a sufficient fee which provide as follows:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved and the skill requisite properly to conduct the
case.
(2) The customary charges of the members of the bar for similar
services.
(3) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting
to the client or clients from the services.
(4) The contingency or certainty of the compensation.
41 PA. STAT. ANN. § 503(b) (Purdon Supp. 1987); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC' 2-17 (1984). This ethical consideration provides:
"A lawyer should not charge more than a reasonable fee, for excessive cost of
legal service would deter laymen from utilizing the legal system in protection of
their rights. Furthermore, an excessive charge abuses the professional relationship between lawyer and client." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC 2-17 (1984).
33. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule I provides in pertinent part:
Every pleading, motion and other paper of a party represented by an
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iv. "Trial judges should carefully examine, on a case-bycase basis, whether liability and damage issues should be tried
separately."

34

v. "Non-unanimous jury verdicts should be permitted in
35
tort cases, such as verdicts by five of six or ten of twelve jurors."
vi. "Use of the various alternative dispute resolution mechanisms should be encouraged by federal and state legislatures, by
."36
federal and state courts, and by all parties
.Injury Prevention and Reduction
Recommendation 19 encourages tightening of discipline procedures and adequate support for disciplinary bodies in each
state.
Concluding Recommendation
Recommendation 21 invites discharge of the Action Commission after publication of the Report. This was the favorite recommendation of the Commission members-and perhaps of the
House of Delegates as well. The recommendation was unanimously approved, along with a burst of applause, whether in selfcongratulation or as an expression of relief that the ordeal by debate was now over.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Action Commission did what it was asked to do, and
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated ....

The signature of an attor-

ney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument ...
Id.
34. ABA Tort Liability System, supra note 1, at 37, recommendation 16, comment a. The purpose of this recommendation is to achieve greater economy in
tort cases. Id. In some cases, separation of the issues may be unwarranted because liability cannot be determined without a showing of damages. Id. But
certain complex issues such as collateral source and punitive damages can be
handled more efficiently through segmentation. Id.
35. See 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5104 (Purdon 1981). The statute provides that
"In any civil case a verdict rendered by at least five-sixths of the jury shall be the
verdict of the jury and shall have the same effect as a unanimous verdict of the
jury." Id.
36. The most common forms of alternative dispute resolution include arbitration, mediation, negotiation, and mini-trials. Id.; see ABA Tort Liability System,
supra note 1, Appendix D.
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within the time limit prescribed. Whether it was well, or ill-done
will be determined by others. Implementation or rejection depends upon legislatures, courts, lawyers and affected members of
the public.
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